The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP url' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. Luxembourg. While these referendums were seemingly distinct from one another, identical campaign posters and arguments were circulated across Europe. Diffusion is a process wherein new ideas and models of behavior spread geographically from a core site to other sites (Bunce et al., 2006) . While referendum campaigns have been studied thoroughly, such cross-case influences remain overlooked (e.g. Glencross et al., 2011; Qvortrup, 2006) . I show that campaign arguments were not always homegrown in the 2005 EU referendums. Campaigners could learn from the experience of previous campaigns. This was important because strategic arguments blamed the treaty for controversial issues such as degradation of welfare state or loss of national identity. Diffusion across cases was thus crucial in bringing new arguments into the debate. All campaigns were not created equal, and the cases were not independent.
What are the factors that facilitate such diffusion? In line with the expectations of the policy transfer and modular action literatures, I find that diffusion depends on the existence of channels such as collaborative networks, shared language and common media. Furthermore, based on 85 in-depth interviews with campaigners all across the political spectrum in all four countries, I show that collaborative networks lead to 'shallow' diffusion between campaigners. But where these networks are coupled with shared language and media sources, diffusion becomes 'deep', operating among voters as well as campaigners.
Below, I first review the literature on referendums to highlight the importance of referendum campaigns in shaping public opinion, which makes borrowing campaign arguments all the more important. Next, I bring together the policy transfer and modular action literatures and discuss the paths through which diffusion travels. Third, using extensive interview data, I demonstrate how diffusion effects conditioned campaign dynamics in the 2005 EU constitutional referendums.
Existing Literature: Do Referendum Campaigns Matter?
The voting behavior literature suggests that, in most instances, referendum campaigns are more influential than election campaigns (e.g. de Vreese, 2007) . When parties line up in a non-traditional way, or the issue is unfamiliar to the mass public, referendum campaigns can be decisive (LeDuc, 2002) . This is particularly the case in referendums on international treaties, as voters do not have well-formed opinions. The way an issue is presented can produce dramatic differences in public opinion (e.g. Chong et al., 2007) .
Students of EU referendums have recently turned their attention to referendum campaigns. This literature is divided between 'second-order' and 'issue-voting' interpretations, attributing the results to domestic or European factors (Reif et al., 1980; Siune et al., 1994) . Recent research looks into campaigns closely to understand the circumstances under which voters rely on EU attitudes rather than second-order effects and vice versa (e.g. Garry et al., 2005) . In the most comprehensive comparative study so far, Hobolt (2009) finds that the information provided to voters during the campaigns matters. When the negative consequences of a No-vote/Yes-vote are stressed, more people favor/oppose the proposal.
Similarly, De Vreese and Semetko (2004) show that in the Danish referendum on the Euro the No side broadened the issue to enlargement, social welfare and national sovereignty, identifying this as the key winning strategy for the No campaign.
In the case of the 2005 referendums, the European Constitution was a technical document, and a great majority of the public was unfamiliar with its content. Polls show that public opinion in all four countries favored the TCE several months before the votes.
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Yet the final referendum results varied remarkably, which suggests that the campaigns were important in shaping public opinion. Political actors presented the TCE to their publics strategically by linking it to unpopular themes such as loss of sovereignty or even Turkish membership in the EU. Diffusion facilitated the transfer of such arguments from one campaign to the other.
Diffusion among referendum campaigns is therefore an important but neglected area of research. Closa (2007) shows that the governments were influenced by one another in their decisions to call the TCE referendums in 2005. Jahn and Storsved (1995) , on the other hand, look into cross-case influences among the 1994 EU membership referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. They argue that there was a domino strategy, where the most pro-EU countries (Austria and Finland) started the referendum vote, followed by the two unsure cases (Sweden and Norway). But the strategy failed in Norway. The authors suggest that Norway rejected the treaty mainly because the Norwegian Centre Party was able to organize the anti-EU movement, connecting agrarian interests with national 1 For polls, see: http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2560_2579/2577/Es2577.pdf; http://www.csa.eu/dataset/data2004/opi20040915c.htm; (Eurobarometer, 2004) ; http://www.tns-ilres.com/cms/Home/Nos-secteurs/Politique---Opinion.
independence. Moreover in a survey, only 56% of the Finns showed awareness of the positive results in Austria, whereas the Nordic countries were much more interested in each other's decisions. These findings not only point to the importance of interconnectedness among Nordic countries, but also provide evidence for the significance of campaigns in shaping public opinion. Yet the specific mechanisms of cross-case influences remain overlooked.
Applying Diffusion Theories to Referendum Campaigns
Diffusion involves a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation that is being diffused, and a channel along which the item may be transmitted (Soule, 2003) . My focus is the channels that transmit campaignrelated information between campaigners in different countries. Diffusion studies focus on two main fields -policy transfer and modular phenomena.
Policy transfer
The first venue brings together studies on policy transfer and policy diffusion, looking into the temporal and spatial clusters of policy reform (e.g. Dolowitz et al., 2000; Elkins et al., 2005; Kopstein et al., 2000; Rose, 1991) . Here, the focus is essentially on 'lesson-drawing', a process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop policies within another.
The policy transfer literature shows that political entities that are geographically proximate and thus share political networks and economic, social and cultural linkages borrow more from each other (e.g. Ovodenko et al., 2012; Stone, 2004; Weyland, 2005) . Similarly, the mass media coverage is important in exchanging information from one government to another (Braun, 2011; Dolowitz, 1997) .
For instance, Linos (2011) shows that governments are more likely to imitate countries that are geographically, linguistically, and culturally proximate and thereby disproportionately covered in the news.
While campaign strategies is not a conventional focus for this literature, Dolowitz et al. (1999) study why the Labour Party in the United Kingdom borrowed electoral strategies from the Democrats in the United States. The authors emphasize the importance of the common language between the two states, the shared ideology among the parties, the personal relationships between the leaders, and finally the role of policy entrepreneurs. Similarly, Needham (2010) explores the cases where specific aspects of one campaign such as polling or voter targeting has been borrowed by another. She finds that such transfers were among ideologically similar states and facilitated by leaders, staff and consultants.
Modular action
As a second venue to study diffusion, the modular action literature focuses on action that is based significantly on the prior successful example of others (Beissinger, 2007) . Four democratic revolutionsthe Bulldozer, Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions -which took place in Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2006 are studied as examples of modular political phenomena (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce et al., 2006) . This literature identifies three main channels. First, collaborative networks crossing national boundaries promote diffusion (e.g. Bunce et al., 2006; Tarrow, 2005) . These networks can be provided by NGOs, civil society activists or other more established institutional frameworks. Alternatively, they could be based on interpersonal relations. Studying contention in the UK and France between 1730 and 1848, Rudé (1964) found that information about rebellions diffused through communication networks of travelers along transportation routes. Hedström et al. (2000) showed similarly that between 1894 and 1911 the diffusion of the Swedish Social Democratic Party was an unintended by-product of the political agitators' traveling. Second, studies show that a sense of interconnectedness across cases -resulting from common institutional characteristics, histories, cultural affinities and languages -allows agents to make analogies across cases and read relevance into developments in other contexts (Beissinger, 2007; Tarrow, 2005) . Another channel of diffusion is the media. Studies on race riots repeatedly found that the media served as a channel of diffusion by creating a cultural linkage between African Americans in different metropolitan areas (Myers, 2000; Soule, 2003; Spilerman, 1976) . Tarrow (2005) suggests that such channels lead to a common 'theorization' across boundaries, where a matter is defined within a cause-effect relationship. Today there is an emerging literature on the impact of social media on collective action, particularly in relation to the Arab Spring (Aday et al., 2012; Pierskalla et al., 2013) .
Importantly, these channels parallel the findings of the policy transfer literature. Both literatures emphasize the political, economic, social and cultural linkages, the similarities between the sending and receiving units (including linguistic or ideological closeness), and mass media coverage in enabling such
transfers. Yet, neither applied these arguments to referendum campaigns. Below are the three hypotheses drawn from these studies:
H1: The more collaborative networks the campaigners from different states share, the more their campaigns will be influenced by one another.
H2:
The more linguistic and cultural similarities the states have, the more their campaigns will be influenced by one another.
H3:
The more media channels the states share, the more their campaigns will be influenced by one another.
As such, diffusion is the cooperation among campaigners in different countries and the subsequent adoption of campaign arguments elaborated elsewhere. The channels, in turn, are what determine the existence and level of such diffusion. Operationalizing the dependent variable and demonstrating that borrowing occurred is difficult as similar strategies may emerge in different settings without clear lines of causality (Needham, 2010, p. 610) . James and Lodge (2003) criticize the policy transfer approach for not sufficiently distinguishing borrowing from rational policymaking, rendering finding evidence for such transfers problematic. In the literature, cross-national policy transfer is evidenced through three steps; policy-makers searching for a policy, visiting a lender country to examine the policy, and the essential features of the policy to be present in the borrower country (Dolowitz et al., 1999; Needham, 2010) . In this research, physical contacts such as participation in each other's campaigns or in joint political events; discussions among the campaigners on campaign themes for instance through specific conferences on the treaty; and the presence of campaign arguments and strategies in borrower campaigns visible in identical leaflets or in the campaign preparation processes, were studied closely as possible indicators of such transfers.
Data
In 2005, some other EU member states also intended to hold a referendum to ratify the treaty, however they decided not to do so after the French and Dutch rejections. I limit the analysis to the four countries that actually held referendums because the campaign preparations in the other countries did not have the same urgency and thereby were not comparable. I conducted the field research between AprilDecember 2008 and interviewed campaigners from all political parties and civil society groups that were active in the campaign. These interviews were in English, French or Spanish, face-to-face, semistructured, and based on both opportunity and snowball sampling. I interviewed 85 campaigners: 19 from Spain, 23 from France, 22 from the Netherlands, and 21 from Luxembourg. Overall, 32 of the interviewees were campaigners from civil society, 53 from political parties; 40 were No campaigners, 45
were Yes campaigners. The questionnaire used and a full list of the organizations interviewed are presented at the end of this article.
Diffusion in 2005 TCE Referendums
In 2005, campaigners in the four countries that held referendums on the TCE discussed campaign themes and borrowed arguments from one another. Table 1 The number of interviewees that mentioned interactions through collaborative networks is considerably higher as this channel is shared by all four states. In contrast, it is primarily French and Luxembourgish interviewees that brought up the transfers through the last two channels. This is not surprising because Luxembourg speaks French, consumes French media channels and receives a substantial number of commuters from France every day. Thus, the interaction between France, Spain and the Netherlands was not as strong as that between France and Luxembourg. This interaction was so dense that the main Luxembourgish No campaigner, the left-wing No Committee, took its lead from the French No campaign.
Detailed interview data shows that collaborative networks lead to 'shallow' diffusion between campaigners, by connecting them and enabling them to discuss campaign themes. The addition of a shared language and common media channels, however, generates 'deep' diffusion among campaigners and voters, by increasing the presence of campaign arguments in borrower states. Furthermore, this research finds that diffusion was not sequential. Because the debate in France started very early, themes of the French debate could be traced even in Spanish campaigners' arguments, whose referendum preceded France's. For further empirical evidence showing that French arguments appeared in the Luxembourgish campaign see (Dumont et al., 2007) .
Below, I address the indicators of diffusion -physical contacts, discussions among the campaigners on campaign themes, and presence of campaign arguments in borrower campaigns -in the discussion of each channel.
Collaborative Networks
This channel, composed of institutional and personal connections, leads to physical contacts and discussion of campaign themes among campaigners. Nevertheless, the extent to which arguments were borrowed varies across cases. The existence of a shared language deepens such interactions and leads to a greater degree of adoption in the borrower states.
A. Institutional networks
Institutional networks were common to all four cases, and were mentioned in the interviews as important facilitators. These were namely the European Parliament (EP) groups, the European antiglobalization network, and other ad hoc European networks. First, both the Yes and No campaigners pointed to the EP groups and parties as platforms to share ideas with other similar European political parties. This formed a regular meeting opportunity, where most of the campaigners said they discussed campaign themes. Although these networks constituted a platform for political parties, the extent to which they were influential in shaping the campaigns is not uniform across the political spectrum. Their motivation was to show that it was not only a French resistance. Susan George of ATTAC France said: 'We wanted to show that this was not a Franco-French affair, that we were not alone, and that a lot of people in Europe shared our views '. 9 As Francine Bavay of The Greens, put it: 'We tried to alert all European ecologists. We wanted to show that we were not nationalists'.
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In the Netherlands, Willem Bos, president of the left-wing ConstitutionNo, said that in preparation for the campaign, they first read on the topic and that they knew the discussion in France as Anne-Marie Berny from the ATTAC-LUX similarly stated that most of the ATTAC-LUX members were in fact French living in Luxembourg. 19 While she mentioned that the ATTAC France, Germany and Belgium helped them, she stressed that that they have been in regular contact with the ATTAC France throughout the campaign. Furthermore, the ATTAC France has financially contributed to the ATTAC Luxembourg's campaign to a small extent. 20 Therefore, the shared language between France and Luxembourg intensified the influence of the anti-globalization network between these two cases. Luxembourg's No campaign adopted French arguments to a larger degree than the Spanish or Dutch campaigns.
Luxembourgish Yes campaigners referred to this influence openly. Pierre Gramegna, DirectorGeneral of the Chamber of Commerce, noted: 'They had an anti-Europe network that they have benefited from. ... They had all the anti-Europe material, they were pretty informed, most of them probably did not even read the TCE, but they did not need to read it because they got all the prepared literature against it'. 
B. Personal connections
Among the states holding referendums on the TCE, France and Luxembourg shared two large mobile communities that facilitated physical contacts and carried the campaign debate across the border: crossborder employees and students. The population of Luxembourg is just below half a million. In the 1970s, the shift from an industrial to a service-oriented economy necessitated foreign labor -both immigrants and cross-border workers (STATEC, 2003) . Today, over one-third of the population is non-Luxembourger. 2004 census data shows that among the foreign residents of Luxembourg French forms the second largest group after the Portuguese (Scuto, 2009) . Furthermore, regarding cross-border employment, around 118,385 crossborder employees come into Luxembourg on a daily basis from France, Germany and Belgium (EURES, 2005) . More than 50% of these cross-border employees come from France. This group of daily commuters imported campaign themes from abroad. Tom Graas, then director of the Luxembourg Television and Radio (RTL) television news, explained that the French commuters had a big influence as the discussions were carried everywhere from offices to restaurants.
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The second community contributing to personal connections is the mobile students. The University of Luxembourg was founded only in 2003. Frédéric Krier from the student union UNEL explained that they had members who studied in the neighboring countries and that specifically, during the 2005 campaign, those in France were very important in organizing the Luxembourgish campaign.
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Adrien Thomas from the UNEL, who was a doctoral student at Sorbonne at the time, took part in both campaigns and stated that most students came back to Luxembourg before the July referendum, after their classes were over. (Stell, 2006) . For the other cases, the lack of a common language became a barrier for further diffusion.
My Spanish interviewees mentioned the lack of a common language as a problem blocking further cooperation. José Manuel Fernández Fernández of the IU explained that from the other three countries, they only invited a few campaigners who spoke Spanish to contribute to the Spanish campaign.
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Similarly Carlos Girbau Costa, from the Social Forum and the IU, pointed to the different cultures of north and south Europe and mentioned that the Netherlands and Luxembourg were far from Spain, while France shared both cultures.
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Jaime Pastor, member of the IU and the ATTAC also mentioned closer ties to France and said: 'We did not meet with Dutch. France was more important for us, because we were familiar with their debate'. France has more of a Latin culture, we have been Protestant for centuries, and they have been Catholic.
There is a difference between these cultures in Europe. Our orientation is more towards the UK or Scandinavia'.
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Michiel van Hulten, director of the civil society Yes campaign, the Foundation for a Better Europe, also mentioned that they had relatively more connection with the UK.
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He added: 'In the EU, they usually discuss with us, it is also the language which makes it easier'. In France, indeed, the interviewees highlighted this factor as a facilitator of cooperation with Luxembourg. Pierre Khalfa from the ATTAC explained that they had invited people from other countries only if they spoke French.
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Similarly Yves Salesse, the co-President of the Copernic Foundation, mentioned that he was invited to Luxembourg but not to the Netherlands due to the language problem. Chairman Alex Bodry stated that it was 'inadmissible for a leader from the French Socialist Party to come to Luxembourg to defend a position that was contrary to that democratically adopted by the Luxembourg Socialists'.
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The invited campaigners were therefore highly visible in the campaign, both helping Luxembourgish campaigners in shaping their debate and interacting directly with voters.
Common Media Channels
This channel contributes to transfer of campaign themes across borders, thereby leading to an increased presence of campaign arguments from the other states. Once again, these transfers go beyond the campaigners and reach voters as well. Among the 2005 TCE referendums, only Luxembourg and France shared media channels. Luxembourgers receive French television channels and newspapers on a daily basis. Regarding television, the local broadcaster RTL operates six channels, but only one in Lëtzebuergesch (Stell, 2006) . The national television channel airs only from 6pm to 8pm, while the rest of the channels are received directly from France and Germany. Tom Graas, then director of the RTL television news, stressed that not only the results and aftermath of the French referendum but also the 36 Interview, 15 April 2008. 37 Quoted in (Deloy, 2005 While such media exposure might be a common problem for campaigners in a globalizing world, Luxembourg's peculiar media set up has magnified the impact of the foreign press, by bringing in the French analysis of the TCE. Luxembourgish citizens were directly exposed to French argumentation.
Implications for Referendum Results
Diffusion matters because strategic arguments are shown to affect public opinion. Even though Luxembourg approved the referendum, as opposed to the outcome in France, it is important to look at the Luxembourgish percentages closely. The No vote intentions went from a very low initial level to a significant 43%, which is remarkable for the highly pro-EU Luxembourg. A TNS-ILRES study found interesting evidence of diffusion. geographical distribution of the negative vote supports the argument. Of the nine communes of Luxembourg that voted against the TCE, seven of them are located right at the border with France. 46 Yet, understanding whether borrowed arguments influenced referendum results requires further research. While borrowing from the previous successful campaigns is an advantage for the campaigners in second-mover states, both the modular action and policy transfer literatures warn that these arguments should be adapted to the national framework to increase their potential (Dolowitz et al., 1996; Newmark, 2002; Snow et al., 1999; Soule, 2003) . In this research, although the ATTAC France was seen as a reference point through their early analysis of the TCE among the three adopter countries, it was only the Dutch campaigners who paid significant attention to local tailoring of these arguments.
The far left SP strategically linked these anti-globalization arguments to the loss of sovereignty in a European 'super-state'. The SP Secretary-General Hans van Heijningen explained that far left messages would not carry them to 51% in the Netherlands and strongly emphasized the work that had to be done nationally.
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Direction of diffusion is another question that requires attention. In this research, chronological order appears to be the main factor designating French campaign as the source because the French campaigners were the ones that prepared the first analysis of the TCE. In the modular action literature, McAdam (1995) distinguishes between initiator movements, which set a protest cycle in motion, and spin off movements, which are sparked by the initiators. Similarly, the policy transfer literature highlights the dominance of the United States in the transfer of election strategies due to its global ideological hegemony (Dolowitz et al., 1999; Needham, 2010) . An important question is whether there is an element of size as well (e.g. Linos, 2011; Ramos et al., 2007) . Would Luxembourg be able to serve as the source campaign? This has crucial policy implications. In 2005, the fact that Spain held the first 46 (Hausemer, 2005) . Socioeconomic status could however be an alternative explanation for this concentration. referendum was not a coincidence (Torreblanca, 2005) . 48 Spain's strong pro-EU attitude was envisioned to build a positive momentum yet this was not achieved.
Conclusion
In contrast with the assumption in most social scientific analyses, cases are not always independent from each other. However, diffusion depends on the existence of channels. The degree to which the campaigners are in contact, discuss campaign themes, and borrow from one another depends on these channels. Collaborative networks exist all around in Europe and facilitate 'shallow' diffusion between campaigners by providing platforms to meet and share campaign-related information. Nonetheless, a 'deeper' version of diffusion, which imports arguments from other campaigns, is visible among states that speak the same language and share media channels, involving not only campaigners but voters as well.
Can the findings of this research be generalized? The literature highlights the exceptionality of the 2005 referendums. Closa (2007) argues that the European arena created a norm in favor of holding referendums during that period. Wimmel (2013) stresses that the TCE referendums were the first EU referendums to be held in Spain, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. While these are indeed exceptional circumstances, this does not mean that diffusion is limited to the four cases. Europe is full of states that share similar cultures, media sources, institutional and personal connections. In a globalizing world, we are bound to see more and more interactions among these states. Had Germany or Belgium held their referendums before Luxembourg, these states would probably have had a similar impact as they also share peculiar diffusion channels with Luxembourg. Focus group data showed that Luxembourgers complain about the doubling of prices after the Euro in the exact same way as Germans discuss it; referring to 'Teuro', a German term combining 'teuer' -expensive -with 'euro' (Dumont et al., 2007) . 
Interview Questionnaire
• What were the main issues/arguments raised in your campaign for/against the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe? • Why did you specifically choose these issues?
• Did your party/organization have a campaigning strategy?
• Was your campaign affected by the referendum campaigns in other countries?
• If so, which countries were they? Why? How was your campaign affected?
• Did you meet with any campaigners from other countries?
• If so, which networks facilitated such meetings? Were these meetings regular?
• Did you have any contacts with the campaigning groups in other countries through transnational party groups or NGOs? • Did you use the issues/arguments raised in other countries' campaigns?
